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TOWARD A LEGAL DEONTIC LOGIC
Howard Pospesel*
I. DEONTIC MIXTURES
Consider this argument (let's call it 'Yugo"):
"Yugd
All automobiles are required to be licensed.
All licensed vehicles are required to be insured.
All automobiles are vehicles.
Your Yugo is an automobile.
So, your Yugo is required to be insured.
In this paper I endeavor to answer the following questions:
Is 'Yugo" valid (under some interpretation), that is, does its
conclusion follow from its premises with logical necessity?
If "Yugo" is valid, is there a system of logic in which this fact
can be demonstrated? If such a system is not currently
available, can we develop one?
If "Yugo" is invalid, what feature makes it so?
We can represent the first premise of 'Yugo" in standard predi-
cate logic' if we lump the element of requirement together with the
licensing concept to form the compound predicate is required to be
licensed:
(x) (Ax -* LX) 2
(Ax = x is an automobile, Lx = x is required to be licensed)
However, the predicate is required to be licensed does not occur in the
second premise of 'Yugo"; conversely, in this treatment of the argu-
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Miami. I have been assisted in the
preparation of this paper by a sabbatical leave provided by the University of Miami. I
have benefitted from discussions with Professors Edward Erwin, Risto Hilpinen, and
Harvey Siegel. Professor Robert E. Rodes has made many good suggestions for
improving the paper.
1 "Standard predicate logic" extends standard propositional logic to include the
machinery of individual constants, variables, and quantifiers plus property and rela-
tional predicates. See infra note 5 for a definition of "standard propositional logic."
2 This formula may be read: "For any (individual) x, if it is A, then it is L."
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ment, the predicate "is licensed" occurs in the second premise, but
not in the first. As a result, no connection between these two premises
is detected, and so "Yugo" is judged to be invalid in standard predicate
logic.
If we are to find a logic that assesses "Yugo" as valid, we evidently
must turn to some form of deontic logic,3 that is, to a logic that employs
a logical operator with the meaning "it is required that."4 Let's see
how "Yugo" fares when treated in an elementary form of deontic logic
I shall call "standard deontic logic" (SDL). By SDL I understand a
system of standard propositional logic5 augmented by the three (fully
interdefineable 6) deontic operators:
0 (It is required that)
P (It is permitted that)
F (It is forbidden that),
and embodying these deontic principles (and no others):
(P1) Whatever is entailed by what is required is also
required.
7
3 Deontic logic is the logic of the expressions "required" (or "obligatory"), "per-
mitted," and "forbidden." See G.H. von Wright, Deontic Logic, LX MIND 1, 1-15 (1951),
for the first viable system of deontic logic. See Dagfinn F0llesdal & Risto Hilpinen,
Deontic Logic: An Introduction, in DEoNTIc Locic: INTRODUCrORY AND SYSTEMATIC READ-
INGS 1, 1-35 (2d ed. 1981) for a survey of the field.
4 In some versions of deontic logic, including von Wright's, the deontic opera-
tors attach to names of acts (or act types) rather than to propositions. In such sys-
tems, the requirement operator will have the meaning "it is required to do," rather
than "it is required that." In propositional deontic logic, it is states of affairs (not acts)
that are required.
5 By "standard propositional logic" I mean any system of propositional logic that
gives the customary two-valued truth-table definitions to the propositional connectives
"and" (&), "or" (v), "if" (-4), "if and only if" (<->), and "not" (-).
6 OA=, -P-A=a F-A
PA=df -O-A=df -FA
FA=df O-A=df -PA
7 There is an ambiguity in P1 that is shown in the following (distinct) symbolic
formulations of the principle:
If A entails B, then OA entails OB.
If the conjunction A & ... & M entails N, then the conjunction OA & ... &
OM entails ON.
(For the second formulation we should allow for the limiting case of a "conjunction"
that has only one conjunct.) We can illustrate the difference between these two
formulations of P1 with the help of these two arguments:
(Al) G[C & (C -- D)] I- OD
(A2) OC & O(C -- D) I- OD
The premise of Al has the general form OA, while the premise of A2 has the general
form OA & OB. Accordingly, the first formulation of P1 applies to Al, but not to A2.
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(P2) Whatever is required is permitted.8
(P3) Whatever is logically necessary is required. 9
'Yugo" may be represented in standard deontic logic as:
OB, OC, D, E I- OF
(B = All automobiles are licensed, etc.)
In this symbolization the first premise of 'Yugo" is understood to
mean: "It is required that all automobiles be licensed"; the second
premise and the conclusion are treated in a similar fashion. Of
course, this symbolized argument is assessed as "invalid"; there are no
discernible connections among its elements. Obviously, the logical
structure of 'Yugo" requires a more discriminating tool than SDL.
Suppose we expand SDL by incorporating the machinery of pred-
icate logic. That is, we add to SDL individual variables (x, y), individ-
ual constants (a, b), property predicates (Fx, Gx), relational
predicates (Rxy, Sxyz), and universal and existential quantifiers ((x),
(3x)). We remain true to the spirit of SDL by requiring that deontic
operators not fall within the scope of quantifiers. For lack of a better
name, I will call such a system "standard deontic logic plus [quantifi-
ers]" (SDL+).
To illustrate how sentences may be symbolized in SDL+ let's apply
that system to the following argument (which I take to be valid):
It is required that all automobiles be licensed.
It is required that all licensed automobiles be insured.
So, it is required that all automobiles be insured.
In symbols:
" (x)(Ax -> Lx)
O(x) [(Lx & Ax) -- Ix]
1-0(x) (Ax -> Ix)
(Lx = x is licensed, Ix = x is insured)
The second formulation of P1 applies to A2 and (with the help of the parenthetical
comment above about the limiting case) to Al as well. Obviously the second
formulation of the principle has a greater scope of application than the first.
Principle P1 should be understood in the second sense. If it is understood in the first
sense, then we must add the agglomeration principle (discussed in Part II below) to
P1 through P3 to capture SDL.
8 In Part II, I argue that P2 should be rejected by a legal deontic logic.
9 P3 is a logical consequence of P1 and the obviously true claim that something
is required (thanks to the logical principle that every statement entails every logical
truth).
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SDL+ judges this argument to be valid because (a) SDL+ incorporates
principle P1 (listed above) and (b) standard predicate logic deter-
mines the following symbolized argument to be valid:
(x) (Ax -- Lx)
(x) [(Lx& Ax) -J Ix]
I-(x) (Ax -- Ix)
How does "Yugo" itself fare when treated in SDL+? The argu-
ment is readily symbolized in that system:
O (x)(Ax -* Lx)
O(x) [(Lx & Vx) --> Ix]
(x) (Ax -> Vx)
Ac10
I-OIc
(Vx = x is a vehicle, c = your Yugo)
'Yugo" is judged by SDL+ to be invalid for the simple reason that
SDL+ ignores the third and fourth premises; it ignores those premises
because they are non-deontic. Neither SDL nor SDL+ is equipped to
deal with premise sets containing non-deontic statements." From the
vantage point of SDL+, the third and fourth premises of "Yugo" van-
ish; since the conclusion does not follow from the two deontic prem-
ises alone, SDL+ judges the argument to be invalid.
Let's focus on this issue of deontically mixed arguments (my label for
arguments such as 'Yugo" that contain both deontic and non-deontic
premises). Consider a stripped-down version of 'Yugo" and its sym-
bolization in SDL+:
"Short Yugd'
It is required that all automobiles be insured.
Your Yugo is an automobile.
So, it is required that your Yugo be insured.
0 (x) (Ax -> Ix), Ac t- 01c
"Short Yugo" seems to exhibit a common form of legal argumenta-
tion: the application of a law to an individual case. And the argument
does appear to be valid; it seems impossible that the premises be true
but the conclusion false. However, because the second premise of
"Short Yugo" is non-deontic and the conclusion does not follow
10 This formula may be read "individual c has property A," or just "c is A."
11 This is an over-simplification. SDL and SDL+ can tolerate non-deontic prem-
ises if they play a role (via non-deontic principles) in reaching deontic formulas. For
example, SDL can treat the following symbolized argument adequately even though
its second premise is non-deontic: P -4 OQ P I- 0 (Q v R).
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straight away from the first premise, SDL+judges the argument to be
invalid.
Can we enrich SDL+ so that the resulting system will assess "Short
Yugo" as valid while avoiding obviously paradoxical results? Perhaps
there is some deontic principle that can be added to the three already
embraced by SDL+. This principle might appear promising:
(P4) From "O(A -> B)" derive "A --> OB."
A system embracing principle P4 will indeed judge "Short Yugo" valid,
as this proof shows:
(1) O(x)(Ax -> Ix) Premise
(2) Ac Premise
(3) O(Ac -> Ic) From line 1 by P112
(4) Ac -> OIc From line 3 by P4
(5) OIc From lines 4 and 2 by modus ponens
Unfortunately, such a system will judge to be valid many other argu-
ments that are obviously invalid. Worse than that (if worse is possi-
ble), in a system that includes P4, if any requirement is violated,
anything whatsoever becomes obligatory; that is, "OA & -A" entails
"OB" in such a system.' 3 Obviously we must reject principle P4.
Compare "Short Yugo" with two other arguments that appear to
have the same form:
"Uninsured'
It is required that all uninsured objects not be automobiles.
Your Yugo is not insured.
So, it is required that your Yugo not be an automobile.
12 For the sake of brevity, I omit establishing that "(x) (Ax - Ix)" entails
"Ac - Ic7.
13 In the proof below, the formula on line 7 is derived free of assumptions; this
shows that it is logically true and a candidate for the move on line 8.
(1) OA & -A Premise
(2) -A Provisional assumption
(3) A Provisional assumption
(4) A v B From line 3 by disjunctive addition
(5) B From lines 4 and 2 by disjunctive argument
(6) A -4 B From lines 3 and 5 by conditionalization
(7) -A -4 (A - B) From lines 2 and 6 by conditionalization
(8) O[-A -> (A -* B)] From line 7 by P3
(9) -A -4 0(A -> B) From line 8 by P4
(10) -A From line 1 by simplification
(11) O(A -> B) From lines 9 and 10 by modusponens
(12) OA From line 1 by simplification
(13) OB From lines 11 and 12 by P1
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[L
0(x) (-Ix -> -Ax), -Ic - -Ac
"Fingerprints"
It is required that all nursery school operators have finger-
prints on file.
Jill operates a nursery school.
So, it is required that Jill have fingerprints on file.
O (x)(Nx -> Fx), Nj -OFj
(Nx = x is a nursery school operator, Fx = x has
fingerprints on file, j = Jill)
"Uninsured" is invalid. The conclusion will be false even if the prem-
ises are true. The law can no more require that your Yugo not be an
automobile than it can require that some Lutherans not be Protes-
tants. 14 "Fingerprints," on the other hand, looks valid, but there is
good reason to suspect that it is not. Here is the argument: If "Finger-
prints" is valid, the following argument is valid as well, since the two
arguments have essentially the same form.
It is required that all persons who do not have fingerprints
on file not be nursery school operators.
Jill does not have fingerprints on file.
So, it is required that Jill not be a nursery school operator.
But if this argument and "Fingerprints" are both valid, then the result
of melding them into a larger third argument will also be valid:15
It is required that all nursery school operators have finger-
prints on file.
Jill operates a nursery school.
It is required that all persons who do not have fingerprints
on file not be nursery school operators.
Jill does not have fingerprints on file.
So, it is required that Jill have fingerprints on file, and it is
required that Jill not be a nursery school operator.
0 (x)(Nx - Fx), Nj, 0 (x)(-Fx -- -Nx), -Fj -OFj & O-Nj
(Universe of discourse: 16 people)
14 Distinguish "The law requires that some Lutherans not be Protestants" from
"The law requires of some Lutherans that they not be Protestants." The latter sen-
tence, but not the former, could be true.
15 It is a principle of logic that if P entails Q and R entails S, then P and R to-
gether entail the conjunction Q & S.
16 The universe of discourse is the class of individuals over which the variables
range. When no universe is specified, it is unrestricted.
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The first and third premises of this larger argument are logically
equivalent according to SDL+,' 7 and that result appears to be correct.
If an argument has two logically equivalent premises (i.e., premises
having the same content), one of them may be dropped without af-
fecting the validity (or invalidity) of the argument. Also, conjoining
two premises of an argument never alters the argument's validity. So,
we may delete the third premise of the merged argument, and con-
join two of its remaining premises to reach a fourth argument:
"Scofflaw"
It is required that all nursery school operators have finger-
prints on file.
Jill operates a nursery school, but does not have fingerprints
on file.
So, it is required that Jill have fingerprints on file, and it is
required that Jill not be a nursery school operator.
Clearly "Scofflaw" is invalid. What follows from its premises is only the
weaker statement: It is required thatJill either have fingerprints on file
or not operate a nursery school. (And according to SDL+ that state-
ment follows from the first premise alone!) We have shown that if
"Fingerprints" is valid, so is "Scofflaw"; but "Scofflaw" is invalid.
Therefore, "Fingerprints" is an invalid argument (in spite of appear-
ances), and SDL+ rightly rejects it.
So, "Short Yugo" is (or appears to be) valid, whereas "Uninsured"
and "Fingerprints" are invalid. What accounts for this difference? I
think the crucial difference is that the non-deontic premise of "Short
Yugo" is in some sense a necessary truth, while the non-deontic prem-
ises of the other two arguments are not.18 Because the second prem-
ise of "Short Yugo" enjoys a kind of necessity, it presents an
unalterable fact, while the second premises of the other two argu-
ments, being contingent, concern what is alterable. Jill can stop oper-
ating a nursery school; your Yugo cannot stop being an automobile.
Any event (like being crushed into a cube of steel) that caused your
Yugo to cease being an automobile would also cause it to cease being
a Yugo. Jill, however, can cease to operate a nursery school and still
remain Jill. Jill can bring herself into compliance with the law either
by not being a nursery school operator or by having fingerprints on
fie. Your Yugo can comply with the law only by being insured. I sub-
17 This is so because SDL+ incorporates principle P1, and standard predicate
logic judges "(x) (Nx - Fx)" and "(x) (-Fx - -Nx)" to be logically equivalent, i.e., to
entail one another.
18 I am indebted to Professor Risto Hilpinen for the suggestion that modal logic
may help solve the problem of deontically mixed arguments.
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mit that that is the reason "Short Yugo" is valid and "Fingerprints" and
"Uninsured" are not.
The second premise of "Short Yugo" is not demonstrable using
the techniques of logic, but it enjoys some measure of necessity none
the less. Let's describe it as "conceptually necessary" and understand
conceptually necessary truths to embrace logical truths, analytical
truths (definitional truths), and statements that assign individuals to
appropriate fundamental categories. 19 The latter kind of statement
can be termed "categorial"; the second premise of "Short Yugo" is a
categorial statement. Now we can broaden principle P3 of SDL+
("Whatever is logically necessary is required") into P3' as follows:
(P3') Whatever is conceptually necessary is required.
We can strengthen SDL+ by adding to it a system of modal
logic, 20 and we can dub the result "standard deontic logic plus [quanti-
fiers] plus [modalities]" (SDL++). Let's take the conservative course
of (a) incorporating the weakest of the common systems of modal
logic, T,21 and (b) insisting that modal operators not fall within the
scope of quantifiers. T incorporates these modal principles:
(P5) Whatever is logically true is necessary.
(P6) Whatever is necessarily true is true.
(P7) Whatever is entailed by a necessary truth is a
necessary truth.
And for our purposes we will understand the concept of necessity in
these principles to encompass conceptual necessities.
Using the box symbol to represent necessity we may symbolize
"Short Yugo" in SDL++ as follows:
O(x) (Ax ---> Ix), OAc22 I- OIc
SDL++ permits a simple proof of validity for "Short Yugo":
(1) O(x)(Ax -> Ix) Premise
(2) E]Ac Premise
19 Where Fis a category term, F is a fundamental category for individual a if and
only if belonging to F is constitutive of a's identity. Being human is a fundamental
category for Lisa, while being Lutheran is not.
20 Modal logic is the logic of the expressions "necessary" and "possible." See C. I.
LEwis & C. H. LANGFORD, SYMBOLIc LoGic (1932) for the first viable system of modal
logic.
21 See Robert Feys, Les Logiques Nouvelles des Modalitis, XL REvuE NtOSCHOLAS-
TIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE 517-53 (1937), and XLI REvUE NitOSCHOLASTIQUE DE
PHILOSOPHIE 217-52 (1938) (proposing System T); see also G.H. VON WRIGHT, AN Es-
SAY IN MODAL LOGIc (1951) (proposing an equivalent system, called "M").
22 This formula may be read "It is necessary that c is A" or "Necessarily c is A."
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(3) OAc From line 2 by P3'
(4) OIc From lines 1 and 3 by P1
23
There will be no comparable proof for "Uninsured" or "Fingerprints"
because their second premises are not correctly modalized.
We can also construct in SDL+-+ a proof for 'Yugo":
(1) O(x)(Ax -> Lx) Premise
(2) O(x) [(Lx & Ax) -> Ix] Premise
(3) El (x) (Ax -- Vx) Premise
(4) EIAc Premise
(5) O (x) (Ax -- Vx) From line 3 by P3'
(6) OAc From line 4 by P3'
(7) OIc From lines 1, 2, 5, and 6 by
P1
Because premises three and four are conceptually necessary we are
warranted in symbolizing them with the box.
One troublesome consequence of SDL++ is that it makes all con-
ceptual necessities obligatory. Thus, for example, it is (legally) re-
quired that all automobiles be vehicles (line 5 in the proof above) and
that your Yugo be an automobile (line 6 above). This result is odd,
but in my judgment tolerable. A deontic logic that embraces concep-
tual necessities must adopt one of these three positions:
(1) All conceptual necessities are required.
(2) No conceptual necessities are required.
(3) Some conceptual necessities are required and some
are not.
Options two and three are less tolerable than option one. Note that
according to option two all conceptual impossibilities are pennitted.
Another argument for option one is that it accords the same treat-
ment to logical and other necessities. The following consideration
helps lessen discomfort with option one: the obligation conferred on
conceptual necessities is empty in the sense that it cannot be violated.
II. INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS
Does SDL++24 as set out above provide a satisfactory basis for a
legal deontic logic? No, and one major reason is that in SDL++ Fl is
held to be a logical contradiction.
23 Here and elsewhere I omit the trivial step of conjoining lines before applying
P1.
24 SDL++ is the system embracing deontic principles P1, P2, and P3', and modal
principles P5, P6, and P7.
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(Fl) OS & O-S25
We can establish that F1 is a contradiction in SDL++ by deriving from
it an evident self-contradiction.
26
(1) 0S & O-S Premise
(2) OS From line 1 by simplification
(3) O-S From line 1 by simplification
(4) PS From line 2 by P2
(5) -0-S From line 4 by definition of "P"
(6) O-S & -0-S From lines 3 and 5 by conjunction
The problem is that S1 (which is symbolized by Fl) could be true, and
therefore is not contradictory.
(SI) Jones is required to sell the diamond to Smith, and she
is required not to sell it to Smith.
(S = Jones sells the diamond to Smith)
The fact of the matter is that it is possible to have inconsistent legal
obligations, that is, to have two obligations that are inconsistent with
each other.27 (Distinguish that claim from the similar-sounding claim
that it is possible to have a legal obligation to do the contradictory. I
will deny the second claim below.) In what situation would S1 be
true? Where Jones has entered into two contracts, one requiring her
to sell the diamond to Smith and one requiring her to sell it to some-
one else instead.
In a satisfactory system of legal deontic logic F1 must be a contin-
gent formula. That means we must give up one of the rules employed
in the above proof. Simplification and conjunction are valid patterns
if any inference patterns are, so the problematic rule must be either
P2 or the definition of "P." That P2 is the culprit is evident from the
fact that with its help (and without relying on the definition of "P") we
can prove that "OS & O-S" entails the obviously false F2:
(F2) PS & P-S
F2 alleges falsely thatJones is legally free to sell the stone to Smith and
also legally free to not do so.
(1) OS & O-S Premise
(2) OS From line 1 by simplification
(3) O-S From line 1 by simplification
25 Note that Fi is a contradiction if and only if "PS v P-S" is a logical truth.
26 It is a principle of logic that only contradictions entail contradictions.
27 Professor Robert Rodes showed this fact to me. See Helzberg's Diamond Shops,
Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc., 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977), for an
example of inconsistent obligations.
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(4) PS From line 2 by P2
(5) P-S From line 3 by P2
(6) PS & P-S From lines 4 and 5 by conjunction
So, we have no choice but to abandon P2.28
The recognition that inconsistent obligations are possible (that
F1 is not a contradiction) is likely to be the point at which moral deon-
tic logic and legal deontic logic part company.2 9 Ethicists typically ad-
mit that there can be apparent moral dilemmas, but deny that these
are insoluble.30 People can have inconsistent primafacie moral obliga-
tions, but (it is commonly held) only one of those obligations can be
the individual's actual moral obligation. 31 However, this approach is
not going to succeed in legal deontic logic. Ajudge may decide that
Jones' obligation to sell the jewel to Smith takes precedence over her
obligation to sell it to Brown, but that will not show that she had no
actual legal obligation to sell the gem to Brown. If that were so, she
could not be justly required to pay damages for breaking the agree-
ment to sell to Brown, but of course she can be.
It is easy to understand why crafters of a legal deontic logic would
want to regard S1 as contradictory. Inconsistency is as undesirable in
a set of laws as it is in a set of descriptive statements. When legislators
or judges discover that one law contradicts another law (in the same
system of laws), one of the laws must be set aside. What we need to
remember here is that while laws must be consistent among them-
selves, it will always be possible for individuals to incur inconsistent
28 See BRIAN CHELLAs, MODAL LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION 202 (1980), for an exam-
ple of a deontic system that lacks P2. The system also rejects P3 and weakens PI to
the first version displayed in note 7. That system is not intended to apply specifically
to legal deontic reasoning.
See also John Horty, Nonmonotonic Foundations for Deontic Logic, in DEF SAmLE DE-
ONTIc LOGiC 17, 20-23 (Donald Nute ed., 1997), for a discussion of Chellas's and van
Fraassen's proposed solutions to the problem of inconsistent obligations.
29 Ronald Moore held that legal deontic logic differs from moral deontic logic in
two formal respects: the contingency of S1, and the definition of the permission oper-
ator. Ronald Moore, The Deontic Status of Legal Norms, LXXXIII ETmcs 151, 151-58
(1972). However, he seems to have believed that inconsistent legal obligations arise
only when the laws that give rise to them are inconsistent. I argue against that idea
below.
30 Kant writes that "a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable." ImMAN-
UEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 24 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merril 1965).
But see, Bas C. van Fraassen, Values and the Heart's Command LXX J. PHIL. 1, 5-19
(1973), and Ruth Barcan Marcus, Moral Dilemmas and Consistency, LXXVIIJ. PHIL. 3,
121-36 (1980). Van Fraassen argues explicitiy that formulas of the form of S1 are
contingent and that a moral deontic logic must reject prinicple P2.
31 This distinction was drawn by W.D. Ross. See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE
GOOD 19-20 (1930).
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
obligations from a set of consistent laws. This symbolized argument
illustrates the point:
(PRI) O(x)(Dx -- Ex)
(PR2) 0O(x) (Fx -+-Ex)
(PR3) ODg & OFg
I-OEg & O-Eg
The laws expressed by premises one and two are consistent; the incon-
sistency in obligations arises only with the addition of premise three
(which, while deontic, is not a law). A system of legal deontic logic
should be able to represent not only statements expressing laws, but
also statements about the legal obligations incurred by individuals.
Deleting P2 is not the only change that is required by the recogni-
tion of the consistency of F1, as this proof shows.
(1) OS & O-S Premise
(2) OA From line 1 by P1
3 2
If "A" abbreviates "Murders occur" then "OA" is plainly false. For an
appropriate assignment of meaning to "S," F1 (line 1) will be true.
Hence F1 does not entail "OA." P1 is the culprit here, but P1 is at the
heart of deontic logic. If we abandon it entirely, we abandon deontic
logic. Fortunately, we can modify it rather than eliminating it.
(P1') Whatever is entailed by what is consistently required
is also required.
In symbols:
If the conjunction A & ... & M is consistent 3 and entails
N, then the conjunction OA & ... & OM entails ON.
3 4
Having determined that in a legal deontic system F1 should count
as a contingent formula, we have to consider the status of F3. Should
it count as contradictory or (like Fl) contingent?
(F3) 0(S & -S)
32 Line 2 follows from line 1 in part because of the logical principle that
contradictory statements entail any statement.
(1) S & -S Premise
(2) S From line 1 by simplification
(3) S v A From line 2 by disjunctive addition
(4) -S From line 1 by simplification
(5) A From lines 3 and 4 by disjunctive argument
33 A statement is consistent if and only if it is not a logical contradiction.
34 We should allow for the limiting case of a "conjunction" that has only one
conjunct.
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(S3) Jones is required both to sell the diamond to Smith
and not to sell it to Smith.
I believe that F3 (S3) should be regarded as a contradiction. Several
considerations support that view. Note that F4 (below) is a theorem
in any system that embraces P3, and is logically equivalent to F5 in any
system that includes the deontic definitions stated above.3
5
(F4) O-(S & -S)
(F5) F(S & -S)
Can the law both require (F3) and forbid (F5) a logically impossible
state of affairs (S & -S)? That question goes hand in hand with an-
other: Can the law both require and forbid a logically necessary state
of affairs? My intuition is that the law cannot accomplish these feats,
that it can no more require Jones to both-sell-and-not-sell-the-dia-
mond than it can require that some Lutherans not be Protestants, that
the sum of two and two be five, or that your Yugo not be an automo-
bile. The law can only require the bringing about of state of affairs A if
that state is logically possible. If A is logically impossible then we can-
not even understand what it is that the law is (supposedly) requiring.
This is a minimal condition of rationality for statements of legal re-
quirement, that what is required to occur be logically conceivable.
The supposed state of affairs in which Jones both sells and does not
sell the diamond to Smith does not meet this minimum condition.
Of course, the supreme lawgiver in nation N can utter the words
"It is henceforth required by law that adultery will both be and not be
a capital offense," but the mere fact that this sentence has been ut-
tered by the lawgiver does not show that in N adultery both is and is
not a capital offense. There are rational constraints on the content of
legal requirements; logical conceivability is a minimal constraint. If
that constraint is dropped, one has given up any hope that a logic of
legal obligation can be developed.
Here is another consideration pointing in the same direction.
Where A, B, and C are statements, it is generally held that if B is a
component of A, and C is logically equivalent to B, then the substitu-
tion of C for B in A cannot change the truth value of A.36 But then if
F3 is held to be true (for some assignment of meaning to "S"), so is
every statement asserting the requiredness of some contradictory state
of affairs (since all contradictions are logically equivalent). That can't
be tolerated.
35 See supra note 6.
36 This principle does not hold when B occurs in an intensional context; presum-
ably F3 does not provide such a context.
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Those who hold F3 and S3 to be contingent face a dilemma: They
must maintain concerning statements of legal obligation whose con-
stituents are contradictory either that none of them is contradictory or
that some are and others are not. Both positions are puzzling. If
statements of obligation having contradictory constituents are never
contradictory, then presumably no statements of obligation are. State-
ments generally come in three logical varieties (logically true, contin-
gent, contradictory); how are they to explain why this does not apply
to statements of obligation? On the other hand, if some statements of
obligation whose constituents are contradictory are themselves contra-
dictory and others are not, how is this difference to be explained?
All of these considerations support the decision to regard F3 as a
contradiction. We can accomplish that by incorporating into our sys-
tem this principle:
(P8) Whatever is required is conceptually possible.
Now, having decided that F3 is a contradiction and F1 not, we are
forced to give up the plausible agglomeration principle that holds in SDL
(and SDL++):3
7
(OA & OB) -> O(A & B) 3
8
This principle will hold in our system whenever A and B are consis-
tent. What about the converse agglomeration principle (which holds in
SDL):
O(A & B) -> (OA & OB)?
It will hold in our system (even when A and B are inconsistent).39
Now that we have modified P1 and replaced P2 with P8 it is time
to give up the label "SDL++" because we have moved too far from
standard deontic logic. Let's call our modified system "legal deontic
logic" (LDL).
40
37 Peter K. Shotch & Raymond E. Jennings, Non-Kripkean Deontic Logic, in NEW
STUDIES IN DEoNTIc LOGIC 149-62 (Risto Hilpinen ed., 1981) (arguing for the rejec-
tion of the agglomeration principle).
38 The analogue of the agglomeration principle is:
P(A v B) -4 (PAv PB)
This is a theorem of SDL, but it holds in our system only when A and B are consistent.
The converse is a theorem in both systems.
39 When A and B are consistent, the principle will hold thanks to P1'; and when
they are inconsistent, it will hold thanks to the principle that a logical contradiction
entails any statement.
40 As so far developed, LDL embraces deontic principles P1', P3', and P8, and
modal principles P5, P6, and P7.
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III. D RE REQ mUEMENTS
LDL is a useful tool for evaluating a wide range of arguments
involving the concept of legal requirement, but it is not adequate for
treating all such arguments. Consider these two examples:
"Handguns P'
It is required that all police officers carry handguns.
It is required that there be police officers.
So, it is required that there be people who carry handguns.
0 (x) (Px --> Hx), 0 (3x) Px 4l [- 0 (3x) Hx
(Universe of discourse: people; Px = x is a police officer,
Hx = x carries a handgun)
"Handguns IV'
It is required that all police officers carry handguns.
It is required that there be police officers.
So, there are people who are required to carry handguns.
"Handguns I" is obviously valid; this can be demonstrated in LDL (or
even in SDL+). "Handguns II," on the other hand, is invalid. Sup-
pose that there are no police officers in Community C (in violation of
the legal requirement expressed in the second premise). While it is
required that there be people in C who carry guns (the conclusion of
"Handguns I"), there may be no specific individual to whom that re-
quirement applies. The conclusion of "Handguns II" could be false
while the premises are true. In its present form LDL is not equipped
to assess the argument.
Note that in the conclusion of "Handguns II" the deontic term
("required") falls within the scope of a quantifier expression ("there




Note that this formula does not belong to LDL as it is presently consti-
tuted or to any of the systems of deontic logic that we have examined
because they permit the attachment of the 0-operator only to closed
(complete) formulas, not to open formulas such as "Hx." Let's call a
sentence that contains both deontic and quantifier expressions de re if
(at least) some of the deontic terms fall within the scope of quantifier
41 The existential quantifier may be read "there exists an (individual) x such
that."
42 This formula may be read "There is an (individual) x such that it is required
that x is H" or "There is an x that is required to be H."
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terms, and de dicto if none of the deontic terms fall within the scope of
quantifier terms. 4 3 A related distinction will apply to formulas. Until
this section we have concentrated on arguments whose component
deontic sentences can be interpreted de dicto. The conclusion of
"Handgun IT" requires de re treatment.
Let us modify LDL first by changing the formation rules so that de
re formulas are accepted and second by adopting whatever principles
seem necessary to cover this expansion. Note that when we attach the
0-operator to an open formula such as "-ix" we seem to be changing
its meaning (from "It is required that") to something like "is required
to."
Consider these four formulas (two de re and two de dicto) and ex-
amples of statements they may be used to symbolize:
(F6) 0(x)Hx (S6) It is required that all people carry
handguns.
(F7) (x)OHx (87) Each person is required to carry a
handgun.
(F8) 0(3x)Hx (88) It is required that some people carry
handguns.
(F9) (3x)OIHx (S9) Some person is required to carry a
handgun.
(Universe of discourse: people)
I believe that the four formulas (and the four statements they symbol-
ize) stand in these logical relations to one another:
F6 entails every other formula. It seems evident that F6 entails F7.
How could F6 be true while F7 was false? F6 entails F8 courtesy of
principle P1'. Since (as I will argue below) F7 entails F9, by the transi-
tivity of entailment F6 also entails F9.
17 entails only F9. Why does F7 not entail F6? In Community C
there are exactly two rules pertaining to the carrying of handguns by
the police:
(Li) Every police officer who is not on sick leave is
required to carry a hand gun.
(L2) No police officer on sick leave is permitted to carry a
handgun.
(For this example we adopt "police officers" as our universe of dis-
course, and accordingly substitute "police officer(s)" for "person" and
"people" in S6 through 88.) As it happens, none of the police officers
of C are on sick leave. Therefore, 87 is true and S6 false; hence 87
43 This definition will have to be further complicated if we apply it to sentences
that also contain modal terms.
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(F7) does not entail S6 (F6). Why does F7 not entail F8? It is compat-
ible with the rules in community C that every police officer be on sick
leave; so S8 is false; hence S7 (F7) does not entail S8 (F8). F7's entail-
ment of F9 is a consequence of the principle that what is true of all is
true of some. This principle is built into the inference rules gov-
erning the quantifiers (in standard predicate logic).44
F8 entails no other formula in the group. It is obvious that F8 entails
neither F6 nor F7. To show that F8 does not entail F9 we switch exam-
ples. Community C has this law:
(L3) There must be a Director of Recycling.
However, no specific individual is required to hold the post. Hence
S8A (F8) is true and S9A (F9) is false.
(S8A) It is required that some person be a Director of
Recycling.
(S9A) It is required of some person that he or she be a
Director of Recycling.
Therefore, F8 does not entail F9.
F9 entails no other formula in the group. It is obvious that F9 entails
neither F6 nor F7. We showed above that F7 entails F9 but not F8;
that proves that F9 does not entail F8.
We have found four cases of entailment among formulas F6
through F9. One of these (F7's entailment of F9) is covered by the
principles of predicate logic, and another (F6's entailment of F8) re-
sults from deontic principle P1' plus the principles of predicate logic.
We can include the remaining two cases (F6's entailment of both F7
and F9) by adding principle P9 to our system:
(P9) A universal de dicto requirement entails the
corresponding de re requirement.
In symbols:
From "O(x)Fx" derive "(x)OFx."
So far the extension of LDL into the realm of de re obligations
seems rather straightforward. Matters get more complicated when we
turn our attention to singular statements45 like $10 and S11.
(S10) It is required that Al carry a handgun.
44 Some, aware that in predicate logic "(x) (Ax -4 Bx)" does not entail "(3x) (Ax &
Bx)" because of the notorious problem of existential import, may suppose also that
"(x)Ax" does not entail "(3x)Ax" (or, more to the point, that "(x)OHx" does not
entail "(3x)OHx"), but they would be mistaken.
45 A singular statement lacks quantifier terms (like "all" and "some") and con-
tains a name (or an expression that functions like a name) of an individual. In stan-
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(S11) Al is required to carry a handgun.
The de re - de dicto distinction as framed above does not apply to these
statements because they lack quantifier terms; nevertheless S10 uses
the characteristic de dicto expression "It is required that" and Si the
de re expression "is required to." Let's extend the distinction to em-
brace singular statements. We can mark the difference in our symbol-
izations of singular statements by attaching a subscript R (for de re) to
the O-operator when symbolizing de re singular statements.
(F10) OHa
(F1l) ORHa
(When the O-operator in the symbolization of a singular statement
lacks a subscript R we will read it as de dicto. Of course there is no
need for this device in formulas that contain both deontic operators
and quantifiers.) In a formal proof the universal (existential) instan-
tiation of F7 (F9) will be FlI (rather than FlO). F7 (F9) will be de-
rived by universal (existential) generalization from Fl 1 (and not from
F10).
I believe that the following chart correctly depicts the entailment
relations obtaining among formulas F6 through Fl.
(F6) 0 (x) Hx -- (F7) (x) OHx
(F10) OHa -- (Fli) ORHa
I I
(F8) 0(3x) Hx (F9) (3x)OHx
Of course the arrows signify entailment. The entailment rela tions
that obtain because of the transitivity of entailment are shown only
indirectly. (Thus F6's entailment of F8 is shown by means of two
arrows.)
With one exception, the entailments depicted in this chart are
already covered by the principles we have adopted so far (P1', P9, and
the principles of predicate logic). The exception is FlO's entailment
of F11. To encompass that we adopt this principle:
(P10) A singular de dicto requirement entails the
corresponding de re requirement.
dard predicate logic, it is presupposed that the individual named belongs to the
universe of discourse.
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In symbols:
From "OFd' derive "ORFa."
Note that Fl does not entail F10. F10 means approximately "It
is a consequence of the laws that a is H." Fl may be true as a conse-
quence of laws taken together with certain facts. For instance, Fll
may be true because it follows from F12 (a law) when it is coupled
with F13 (a factual claim).
(F12) (x) (Gx - OHx)
(F13) Ga
If one held that FlI entails F10 one would be committed (by the tran-
sitivity of entailment) to the false view that F7 entails F8.
Up to this point principle P1' has been applied only to de dicto
obligations. Should we permit it to apply also to de re singular state-
ments? Apparently not; consider this argument:
It is required that all police officers carry handguns.
Al is required to be a police officer.
So, Al is required to carry a handgun.
0 (x) (Px -- Hx), ORPa I- ORHa
This argument seems to be invalid. Suppose that Al is not a police
officer (in spite of the fact that he is required to be one). It may well
be that in his current civilian status he is not required to carry a hand-
gun. So, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. But if we
allowed P1' to apply to de re singular statements we could construct a
"proof' for the argument.
(1) 0(x)(Px - Hx) Premise
(2) ORPa Premise
(3) 0 (Pa -> Ha) From line 1 by P1'
(4) ORHa From lines 2 and 3 by P1'
With the assistance of LDL fortified with de re obligation we are
now in a position to make an interesting discovery about 'Yugo." We
saw in Part I that if the first two premises are interpreted de dicto, the
argument is valid. That result holds whether the conclusion is under-
stood de dicto or de re. What if one or both of those premises (and the
conclusion) are interpreted de re? Let's consider first the case where
both of these premises are interpreted de re:
Each automobile is required to be licensed.
(x) (Ax - OLx)
Each licensed vehicle is required to be insured.
(x) [ (Lx & Vx) - Ix]
All automobiles are vehicles.
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o (x) (Ax - Vx)
Your Yugo is an automobile.
fAc
So, your Yugo is required to be insured.
IbORIC
Under this interpretation 'Yugo" is invalid; the conclusion can be
false while all the premises are true. Consider this scenario: The law
covering insurance for vehicles includes just one exception and that is
for vehicles operated only on a farm. Your Yugo falls under this ex-
ception, hence the conclusion is false. How, in that case, can premise
two be true? Your Yugo (although required to be licensed) is, in fact,
not licensed. As it happens, no licensed vehicle falls under the farm
exemption; so, premise two is true. The scenario (which has the con-
clusion false) is compatible with the truth of all four premises.
Note that the scenario applies even if the first premise is inter-
preted de dicto. If the second premise is interpreted de re it makes a
claim about things that are (rather than are required to be) licensed.
The first premise (whether interpreted de re or de dicto) makes no
claim about things that are licensed; hence there is no link between
the first two premises (when the second premise is interpreted de re).
Finally, how shall we evaluate the argument when the first prem-
ise is understood de re and the second de dicto?
Each automobile is required to be licensed.
(x) (Ax ---> OLx)
It is required that all licensed vehicles be insured.
o (x) [(Lx &Vx)-4 Ix]
Under this interpretation the argument is also invalid, as the following
scenario shows. Your Yugo is unlicensed and driven only on a farm.
There is a law that says that unlicensed farm vehicles are not required
to be insured; hence, the conclusion of the argument is false. Because
it is unlicensed, your Yugo does not come within the scope of the law
expressed in premise two. The scenario is consistent with the truth of
all four premises; hence, the argument is invalid. Does the scenario
involve postulating inconsistent laws? No. The first premise might be
true because of a law that every automobile for which a "license
waiver" has not been obtained is required to be licensed, coupled with
the fact that no such waivers have been obtained. Note that you can
satisfy the law in the matter of the licensing of your Yugo by obtaining
the waiver. You are not required to obtain insurance.
So we have reached this interesting and possibly surprising con-
clusion about "Yugo": The argument is valid if and only if its first two
premises are interpreted de dicto. One benefit of LDL is that it can aid
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our understanding of the structure of arguments about legal require-
ments expressed in English.
IV. METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY
Let's return briefly to the problem of deontically mixed argu-
ments. We have learned how to accommodate arguments whose non-
deontic premises are conceptually necessary. There are other deonti-
cally mixed arguments whose conclusions exhibit a weaker kind of ne-
cessity. Consider this argument (imagine it to be advanced in
November of 1997) and its symbolization in LDL:
"De Dicto LR.S."
4 6
It is required that everyone who earned more than $13,400
in 1997 file an income tax return by April 15, 1998.
Sarah has already earned more than $13,400 in 1997.
So, Sarah is required to file an income tax return by April 15,
1998.
O (x)(Ex --> Fx), Es I- ORFs
(Universe of discourse: people; Ex = x earned more than
$13,400 in 1997, Fx = x files an income tax return by
April 15, 1998, s = Sarah)
This argument seems to be valid; there appears to be no way for the
premises to be true and the conclusion false. But LDL as so far devel-
oped will not judge it valid because the second premise is not concep-
tually necessary. That premise does exhibit an element of necessity,
namely the impossibility of altering the past.47 If Sarah has already
earned more than $13,400 in 1997 nothing that she or anyone else
can do will change that fact. For want of a better name, let's say that
the second premise of "De Dicto I.R.S." possesses metaphysical necessity.
Can we modify LDL so that it judges "De Dicto I.R.S." valid? One
approach would be to further expand the meaning of the box symbol
and strengthen principle P3' to include metaphysical necessity:
(PI1) Whatever is conceptually or metaphysically necessary
is required.
But this would have a consequence much too paradoxical to swallow:
Every past event (because metaphysically necessary) becomes legally
obligatory. Certainly Sarah was not required by law to earn more than
46 I label the argument "de dicto" because of its first premise (in spite of the fact
that the conclusion is interpreted de re).
47 I take no position here on the question of the determination of future events;
the point is the noncontroversial one that past events are fixed.
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$13,400 in 1997. We could note (as we did in connection with con-
ceptual necessities) that these obligations concerning the past are
empty in the sense that they cannot be violated,48 but even so the
consequence is too counterintuitive to be accepted. We have to find a
different way to accommodate "De Dicto I.R.S."
Another possibility is to employ an operator (M) with the mean-
ing "it is metaphysically necessary that" and then adopt this principle
(reminiscent of P4):
(P12) From "O(A -- B)" derive "MA -> OB."
This would enable us to symbolize and construct a proof of validity for
"De Dicto I.R.S."
O (x)(Ex ---> Fx), MEs I- ORFs
(1) 0(x) (Ex -> Fx) Premise
(2) MEs Premise
(3) O(Es -- Fs) From line 1 by P1'
(4) MEs -- OFs From line 3 by P12
(5) OFs From lines 4 and 2 by modus ponens
(6) ORFs From line 5 by P10
Unfortunately for this proposed solution, P12 succumbs to an ana-
logue of the paradoxical result that plagued P4. With P12 on board, if
any requirement is violated by a metaphysical necessity, anything
whatsoever becomes obligatory; that is, "OA & M-A" entails "OB" in
such a system. Obviously we must reject principle P12.
Perhaps we should weaken P12 like this:
(P12') From "O(A -- B)" derive "MA --> ORB."
P12' would be applicable only where the premise is de dicto and the
consequent of the conclusion represents a de re singular statement.
This principle would suffice for demonstrating the validity of "De Dicto
I.R.S.," and it escapes the lethal problem noted above that affects P12.
Whether P12' is a sound principle remains to be determined.
In the meantime, we must consider the possibility that "De Dicto
I.R.S.," while seemingly valid, is actually invalid, even though the fol-
lowing similar argument is demonstrably valid (even in non-deontic
logic).
"De Re I.RS."
Everyone who earned more than $13,400 in 1997 is required
to file an income tax return by April 15, 1998.
48 That is, whenever "OA" is true because A is metaphysically necessary, A will be
true. (But note that "O-A" may also be true.)
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Sarah has already earned more than $13,400 in 1997.
So, Sarah is required to file an income tax return by April 15,
1998.
(x) (Ex -- OFx), Es I- ORFS
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, in this paper I have set out a system of deontic
logic (LDL) tailored to legal reasoning, built upon standard predicate
logic augmented by modal system T, and embracing these five deontic
principles:49
(DI) Whatever is entailed by what is consistently required
is also required.
(D2) Whatever is conceptually necessary is required.
(D3) Whatever is required is conceptually possible.
(D4) A universal de dicto requirement entails the
corresponding de re requirement.
(D5) A singular de dicto requirement entails the
corresponding de re requirement.
Aside from resolving the problem of metaphysical necessities in
deontically mixed arguments (discussed briefly in Part IV), what tasks
will be involved in the further development of LDL? At least three
kinds of work may be attempted.
(1) Formalization. The approach taken to system development in
this paper has been entirely informal. We need to lay down formation
and inference rules for LDL and adopt a proof format. And a seman-
tics must be provided so that systematic demonstrations of argument
invalidity can be provided. A metatheoretical investigation of the sys-
tem should be undertaken.
(2) Revisions. We should address the paradoxes of material impli-
cation, as they are particularly fierce in deontic logic.50 In order to
solve this problem it may be necessary to reject standard propositional
49 I employ a new system for numbering deontic principles. The new numbers
correlate with the old as follows: D1=Pl', D2=P3', D3=P8, D4=P9, and D5=P10.
50 These paradoxes involve the following patterns (in propositional logic):
P 1- Q-4 P
-P I- P -4 Q
Note that this argument is valid in LDL (and even in SDL+):
It is forbidden that rapes occur.
So, it is required that whoever rapes kill his victims.
F(3x) (3y)Rxy - 0(x) (y) (Rxy -> Kxy)
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logic in favor of some version of conditional logic.5' (A difficulty in-
herent in that approach is the rejection of certain plausible inference
patterns such as chain argument.) We should consider also the im-
pact of other well-known deontic paradoxes.
52
(3) Extensions. We should also consider the desirability of ex-
tending the system in certain directions, for instance, to accommo-
date de re modalities, conditional obligation, or temporal concepts.
We have not considered the issue of iterated or nested operators, for
example, whether either "OOA - OA," "OA -> OOA," or "O(OA -4
A)" should be counted as a theorem in the system.
As its title indicates, the present paper represents just a
beginning.
51 For the two best known systems of conditional logic, see David Lewis,
Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility, in IFs 57 (William L. Harper et al. eds.,
1981); and Robert C. Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals, in IFs, supra, at 41.
52 Both kinds of deontic paradoxes are canvassed in Donald Nute & Xiaochang
Yu, Introduction, in DEF-ASIBLE DEONTiG Logic 4, 4-13 (Donald Nute ed., 1997).
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